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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Cody Michael Phelps appeals from the district court’s judgment and conviction 
sentencing him to a unified term of eight years, with two years fixed, for burglary, and 
from the restitution order ordering him to pay restitution in the amount of $13,107.78.  
The district court erred in awarding restitution in this amount because the State did not 
present any evidence at the restitution hearing regarding either the market value of the 
stolen property at the time and place of the crime, or the replacement cost of the stolen 
property within a reasonable time after the crime.  The district court abused its 
discretion at sentencing because it stated it was imposing a longer indeterminate 
sentence in order to allow Mr. Phelps sufficient time to pay the restitution, which itself 
was erroneous.   
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In CR 2011-7192 (“the controlled substance case”), the district court sentenced 
Mr. Phelps on May 21, 2014, to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, for 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and retained jurisdiction.  
(R., pp.104-09.)  Following Mr. Phelps’ successful completion of a retained jurisdiction 
program, the district court executed Mr. Phelps’ sentence, suspended that sentence, 
and placed Mr. Phelps on probation for a period of four years.  (Conf. Exs., p.54; 
R., pp.110, 113-22.) 
On July 9, 2015, the State filed a new criminal case against Mr. Phelps, CR 
2015-10381 (“the burglary case”), alleging he entered a certain residence on July 6, 
2015, with the intent to commit a felony therein.  (R., pp.180-81.)  The State 
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subsequently filed an Information charging Mr. Phelps with burglary, and alleging he 
was a persistent violator within the meaning of Idaho Code § 19-2514.  (R., pp.240-43.)  
Mr. Phelps entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which he pled guilty to 
burglary and the State dismissed the persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp.273-74; 
9/8/15 Tr., p.21, L.25 – p.23, L.6.)  The district court transferred the matter to the mental 
health diversion program.  (R., p.274.)  Mr. Phelps was terminated from the diversion 
program, and did not contest his termination.  (R., p.279.)   
Mr. Phelps admitted he violated probation in the controlled substance case by 
being charged with burglary.  (R., pp.126-27, 142-45; 9/8/15 Tr., p.23, Ls.7-17.)  The 
district court ordered him to continue on probation, with the condition that he participate 
in and successfully complete the mental health diversion program.  (R., pp.142-45.)  
The district court found he violated probation when he was terminated from the 
diversion program.  (R., pp.150, 152-54.)   
The district court consolidated the controlled substance and the burglary cases 
for the purposes of sentencing.  (10/26/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.7-14.)  In the controlled 
substance case, the district court revoked Mr. Phelps’ probation and executed his 
unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, to be served concurrently with the 
sentence imposed in the burglary case.  (R., p.155.)  In the burglary case, the district 
court sentenced Mr. Phelps to a unified term of ten years, with two years fixed, and 
ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $13,107.78.  (R., pp.288, 293.)  The 
judgment of conviction was entered on November 4, 2015.  (R., pp.287-92.)  Mr. Phelps 
filed a timely notice of appeal on December 9, 2015.  (R., pp.303-06.)  Mr. Phelps also 
filed an objection to the restitution order and, following a hearing, the district court 
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entered a memorandum decision and order concluding the restitution order it previously 
entered would remain in effect.1  (R., pp.299, 314-19; Mot. to Aug., Ex. A.)  
   
   
 
 
                                            
1 The Clerk’s Record contains a copy of the Memorandum Decision and Order entered 
by the district court on December 17, 2015; however, it is missing the second and third 
pages.  (R., pp.316-19.)  Simultaneously with the filing of this brief, Mr. Phelps is filing a 
Motion to Augment the Clerk’s Record to include a complete copy of the district court’s 
Memorandum Decision and Order.  (See Mot. to Aug., Ex. A.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it ordered Mr. Phelps to pay restitution in the 
amount of $13,107.78? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Phelps to a 
unified term of eight years, with two years fixed, for burglary? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
 
The District Court Erred When It Ordered Mr. Phelps To Pay Restitution In The  
Amount Of $13,107.78 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The State did not present any evidence at the restitution hearing regarding either 
the market value of the property Mr. Phelps allegedly stole on July 6, 2015, or the 
replacement cost of that property within a reasonable time after the crime.  The owner 
of the stolen property testified that he purchased the stolen items—specifically, 18 silver 
bars and 700 Kennedy half dollar coins—for $13,107.78 on December 19, 2013.  He 
also testified that he did not know the market value of these items on July 6, 2015, but 
knew the price of silver had declined.  The district court ordered Mr. Phelps to pay 
restitution in the amount of $13,107.78 because this was “a significant amount of money 
for anyone to lose” and the items were purchased “as an investment hoping that [their] 
value would increase over time.”  (Mot. to Aug., Ex. A, p.4.)  The district court erred.  
The purpose of restitution is not to protect a crime victim’s hoped-for profit, but to 
compensate a crime victim for the economic loss suffered as a result of a crime.  Here, 
some of the economic loss the victim suffered resulted not from Mr. Phelps’ crime, but 
from the decline in the price of silver.  The State erred in ordering Mr. Phelps to pay 
restitution which would result in a windfall to the victim. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The decision whether to order restitution is within the discretion of the trial court, 
and this Court will overturn an order of restitution only if there is an abuse of discretion.  
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State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 623 (Ct. App. 2004).  “In reviewing the trial court’s 
exercise of discretion, this Court must determine whether the trial court:  (1) correctly 
perceived the issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
specific choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).   
 
C. The State Did Not Meet Its Burden Of Proving The Amount Of Restitution By A 
Preponderance Of The Evidence 
 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) provides in pertinent part that “[u]nless the court 
determines that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable, it shall 
order a defendant found guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the 
victim to make restitution to the victim.”  The statute defines “economic loss” to include 
“the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed.”  I.C. § 19-
5304(1)(a).  For purposes of restitution, “value” is defined to mean “the market value of 
the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily 
ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the 
crime.”  I.C. § 18-2402(11)(a); see also I.C. § 19–5304(1)(c); State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 
687, 693 (Ct. App. 2007).  The State has the burden of proving the amount of restitution 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  See I.C. § 19–5304(6); State v. Nienburg, 153 
Idaho 491, 497-98 (Ct. App. 2012).   
Mr. Phelps was convicted of burglary, and the district court found he and an 
accomplice entered the victim’s house on July 6, 2015, and stole 18 silver bars and 700 
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Kennedy half dollar coins, which were never recovered.2  (Mot. to Aug., Ex. A., pp.1, 3.)  
The victim testified at the restitution hearing that on December 19, 2013, he purchased 
the silver bars for $245.21 per bar, and the half dollar coins for $12.42 per coin.  
(12/10/15 Tr., p.20, Ls.16-25; p.21, Ls.7-25.)  He testified he purchased these items as 
an “investment” and stored them under his bed.  (12/10/15 Tr., p.24, Ls.16-22.)  The 
victim did not testify about the value of the silver bars and half dollar coins on July 6, 
2015, except to say that the market price of silver declined from December 19, 2013, to 
July 6, 2015.  The following exchange took place between counsel for Mr. Phelps and 
the victim at the restitution hearing: 
Q. Okay.  Well, on the date that this took place, do you know the value 
of the coins or the silver bars on the date of this theft? 
 
A. No, but it was—it was less than what I paid for it. 
 
Q. Okay. 
 
A. Because the value went down on silver but—I bought them 
because I expect the silver value to go up, and I think it will go up 
now because it’s so low that—it’s lower than what they are 
manufacturing them for. 
 
Q. Okay.  So, in fairness here, what was the fair market value of the 
silver bars and the Kennedy coins on the date they were taken? 
 
A. I have no idea what the silver was running for then . . . . 
 
(12/10/16 Tr., p.25, L.16 – p.26, L.6.)  The victim later explained, “Yes, there was a 
different value because silver was lower than it is when I bought it and I don’t know what 
the value of it was when they had taken it.  All I know is what the value is that I spent for 
investment, and it was a long-time investment.”  (12/10/16 Tr., p.26, Ls.20-25.) 
                                            
2 The victim testified that 19 silver bars and 760 half dollar coins were taken from him, 
but he got 1 bar and 60 coins back.  (12/10/15 Tr., p.19, Ls.20-25; p.22, Ls.3-9.)   
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Counsel for Mr. Phelps argued that Mr. Phelps should not be ordered to pay 
restitution because the State did not provide sufficient evidence regarding the value of 
the stolen items.  He said: 
I think . . . the law is clear that they have to determine the fair market value 
of the assets at the time it was taken.  I don’t think it’s fair in this case to 
suggest that my client ought to pay fair market value when acquired 
because I don’t think that is the value at the time it was taken.  So, in 
fairness . . . there has been inability to have proof and, therefore, I think 
the objection should be granted and restitution not be ordered. 
 
(12/10/16 Tr., p.29, L.20 – p.30, L.4.)  The district court contemplated whether it could, 
without any evidence, determine the market value of the stolen items at the time of the 
theft.  (12/10/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.15-23.)  Counsel for Mr. Phelps argued the district court 
could not because it would be “total speculation.”  (12/10/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.1-2.)  Counsel 
argued, “The Court is going outside of what is before it in terms of what evidence there 
might be.”  (12/10/16 Tr., p.31, Ls.1-4.)  The district court took the matter under 
advisement, and then issued a memorandum decision relying solely on the purchase 
price of the silver bars and coins to determine the economic loss suffered by the victim.  
(12/10/16 Tr., p.31, Ls.12-14; R., p.314.)  The court acknowledged that “all [it] ha[d] to 
rely on is what the victim paid for the silver in December of 2013.”  (Mot. to Aug., Ex. A, 
p.4.)  And it concluded this was sufficient because “[the victim] suffered a substantial 
loss of more than $13,000, which is a significant amount of money for anyone to lose.  
He had purchased the silver as an investment hoping that its value would increase over 
time, and he could profit.”  (Mot. to Aug., Ex. A, p.4.)  The district court erred.   
The mere fact that the victim suffered a substantial loss does not mean the State 
provided sufficient evidence for the district court to determine the amount of that loss.  
Idaho Code § 19-5304 provides that determination of economic loss “shall be based 
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upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the court.”  I.C. § 19-5304(6); see 
also In re Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 284 (Ct. App. 2008).  “Thus, the amount of the award 
must be supported by substantial evidence.”  Doe, 146 Idaho at 284 (citations omitted).  
Here, the district court’s award was not supported by substantial evidence.  The State 
presented no evidence regarding either the market value of the stolen property at the 
time and place of the crime or the replacement cost of the property within a reasonable 
time after the crime.  To require Mr. Phelps to pay the victim for the price he paid for the 
silver bars and coins in December 2013, notwithstanding their decline in value, would 
be to hold Mr. Phelps as a guarantor of the victim’s investment and provide a windfall to 
the victim.  This is not the purpose of criminal restitution and the district court’s order 
awarding restitution must be vacated. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Phelps To A Unified 
Term Of Eight Years, With Two Years Fixed For Burglary 
 
Where, as here, the sentence imposed by the district court is within statutory 
limits, “the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of 
discretion.”  State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150 
Idaho 873, 875 (2011)).  The district court abused its discretion here because it did not 
reach its sentencing decision by an exercise of reason.  See Waidelich, 140 Idaho at 
623 (stating standard for abuse of discretion review).   
At sentencing, the district court revoked Mr. Phelps’ probation in the controlled 
substance case, and executed his unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed.  
(R., p.155.)  In the burglary case, the district court sentenced Mr. Phelps to a unified 
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term of ten years, with two years fixed.  (R., p.288.)  The district court ordered that the 
two sentences be served concurrently.  (R., p.288.)  The district court explained it was 
imposing a lengthy indeterminate term in the burglary case specifically (and solely) so 
that Mr. Phelps would have adequate time to pay restitution.  The district court 
explained: 
And, again, regardless of what restitution I determine in the case, I’ll 
simply ask the Parole Board again to monitor those payments so that you 
can get that all taken care of.  And, quite frankly, that’s why, as Mr. Souza 
stated, that’s why there is a longer indeterminate sentence in this case, so 
you can get that stuff taken care of; okay? 
   
(10/26/15 Tr., p.24, L.23 – p.25, L.5.)  As explained above, the district court erred in 
ordering Mr. Phelps to pay restitution in the amount of $13,107.78.  The district court 
abused its discretion at sentencing because the sentence it imposed was tied directly to 
the erroneous restitution award.  If Mr. Phelps is successful in challenging the restitution 
award, this Court should remand this case to the district court for resentencing. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Phelps respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s 
restitution order and his judgment and conviction sentencing him to a unified term of 
eight years, with two years fixed, for burglary, and remand CR 2015-10381 to the district 
court for resentencing.   
 DATED this 14th day of September, 2016. 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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